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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Background
Afghanistan is one of the countries most heavily impacted by landmines and other explosive
remnants of war (ERW). It also has the world’s oldest and largest mine action programmes,
which was established in 1989 and currently comprises over 20 organisations employing over
8,000 people. The Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA) has managed to function –
and with significant success – throughout the ebbs and flows of almost continuous conflict and
despite the many regime changes. MAPA organisations include the some of the largest demining
operators in the world, which have achieved many world ‘firsts’ in the mine action field.1
The United Nations has played a central role in mine action since the inception of the MAPA.
The bulk of international funding for mine action has been channelled via the UN, with the UN
Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (MACA) serving as the principal mechanism for programme
planning and coordination. Following the removal of the Taliban government by the U.S.-led
coalition in late 2001, the Afghan Transitional Authority requested the UN assume responsibility
for mine action on behalf of national authorities. With this endorsement, the MACA re-located its
headquarters from Islamabad to Kabul and (along with the MAPA operators) made important
contributions in support of the initial wave of reconstruction projects.
Since 2003 at least, the MACA has been discussing the eventual transition of the MAPA to
national responsibility. However, despite achievements in promoting national ownership of Mine
Risk Education (MRE) and assistance to landmine survivors (normally termed ‘Victim
Assistance’ – VA),2 little concrete progress has been made in getting the GoA to assume
responsibility for the overall mine action programme, or for demining in particular. Thus, there
appears to be a consensus that the UN-MACA will continue to discharge the central planning and
coordination functions until 2013 (the period covered by the Afghan National Development
Strategy – ANDS) although there is no formal agreement to this effect between the Government
of Afghanistan (GoA) and the UN.3 Over this period, the programme is to achieve the following
targets,4 leaving Afghan authorities responsibility for the residual contamination problem:
Target
All stockpiled antipersonnel mines will be
located and destroyed by
20 March 2008

Indicator & status
• In October 2007, the GoA
announced the achievement of
the Ottawa Treaty obligation to
destroy all known stockpiles.

Comments
• Over 480,000 antipersonnel landmines have
been destroyed.
• Some stockpiles may not
have been located

1
In addition to what many believe to be the first successful civilian demining programme started by
Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC), MAPA organisations conducted the first large socio-economic
impact survey of mine action and implemented the first Landmine Impact Survey.
2
In mid-2007, the UN signed MOUs concerning MRE and VA with the ministries of Education (MoE);
Public Health (MoPH), and Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs, and Disabled (MoLSAMD), and with the
Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS).
3
For example, the ANDS refers to “the 2013 MAPA transition deadline” (p. 55)
4
These were initially established in the Afghan Compact, adopted in early 2006, and the ANDS: 20082013 has incorporated and expanded on the demining targets.
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Target
The area contaminated by
mines and unexploded
ordnance will be reduced
by 70% by the end of 2010
Clear 90% of all known
SHA by 1391 (2012)
Clear all emplaced antipersonnel mines by 1391
(1 March 2013) as per the
Ottawa Convention.

Indicator & status
• Square meters of land
released as safe.
• The baseline is 720 million m2
of suspected hazardous areas
(SHA), implying:
2
o 540 million m need to be
released by the end of
2010
2
o 648 million m by the end
of 2012
o 720 million m2 by 1 March
2013

Comments
• On target relative to the
baseline, however…
• New SHA continue to be
discovered.

Donor countries recognise that, to achieve these targets, the MAPA will remain dependant on
international grants for the medium-term. International funding for mine action has averaged
perhaps $60 million per year since 2002 and, in recent months, Canada and a number of other
countries have renewed or even increased their funding commitments. MACA now talks in terms
of an $85 million per year programme to achieve the targets set in the Afghan Compact and the
ANDS: 2008-2013.
Recent developments
In mid-2007, the UN reorganised the MACA and recruited a new senior management team.
Notably, the Programme Director is an Afghan national. He immediately sought to clarify which
agency is to be the lead role in government for mine action and, presumably, assume
responsibility for the national mine action programme in 2013. As a result, a national mine action
symposium (government; UN; donors; MAPA partners) convened in December 2007. It became
clear at the symposium that the proposed solution envisaged in the draft mine action legislation
prepared by MACA (a semi-autonomous agency reporting to the Office of the President) did not
command the support of some key ministries and, hence, of the GoA. Following this, an interministerial body met in January 2008 and determined that the existing Department for Mine
Clearance (DMC) would serve as the government focal point for mine action.
While this decision does not appear to represent a definitive position of the Government,5 it does
provide an opportunity to initiate a process of building national capacity for the coordination of
demining and mine action overall. The DMC collocated with MACA in May 2008, which will
facilitate coordination between them and give MACA the opportunity to assess the capacity and
commitment of DMC personnel.
MACA has also instituted a number of reforms to demining operations (survey and clearance)
which, taken together, could significantly enhance the cost effectiveness of the programme,
making it more likely that the performance targets set for mine clearance will be reached.
MACA has also revised the set of criteria for setting demining priorities, and established survey
teams to make pre- and post-clearance assessments of demining tasks. Still, it lacks the capacity
to accurately gauge the development benefits arising from mine action, and who receives the
benefits (men-women; income group; etc.). This is a complex task, and will likely require a
partnership with an organisation that has the capacity to conduct vulnerability or sustainable
5

The inter-ministerial body is an ad hoc mechanism, not formally appointed by the President or Cabinet.
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livelihoods surveys of mine-affected communities.
Conclusions and Recommendations
MACA and MAPA more generally have great capacities and make substantial contributions to
peace-building, reconstruction, and poverty reduction, although it is difficult to quantify these
contributions. Current MACA managers are experienced and capable, and have initiated
worthwhile reforms. However, they lack a formal strategy and medium-term plan to ensure: (i)
the GoA and donors endorse the objectives and direction of the programme, and (ii) the reforms
are locked-in when management team members depart.
Some progress has been made in (i) bringing Afghan nationals into decision-making positions
within MACA and (ii) promoting national ownership (particularly for MRE and VA). Recently,
an ad hoc inter-ministerial body provided some clarification concerning the agency to serve as
the government focal point for mine action. However, the Department for Mine Clearance
(DMC) presently has modest capability and unknown commitment.
The UN has a responsibility to transition and exit (envisaged for 2013). Conversely, the GoA has
the responsibility to develop the capacity of its national mine action organs (DMC but eventually
a national authority as well). The UN can only successfully support capacity development if the
GoA is committed both to (i) assume national ownership and (ii) actually deliver the required
mine action services.
What is needed at this juncture is clear: first, a strategy from MACA that would clarify its vision
for the future and provide the basis for policy dialogue with both the Government and the
supporting donors. The intended outcome of the MACA strategy and the policy dialogue would
be a well conceived Government strategy for the national mine action programme. CIDA could
play an important role in this process.
Specific recommendations are:
1.

MACA should assess whether DMC personnel have the basic skills and commitment for a
successful capacity development process. At minimum, these pre-conditions for success are
(i) adequately educated and experienced personnel and (ii) a champion for change in the
senior management ranks of DMC. If these pre-conditions are not in place, the UN should
not waste time and money on capacity development support until changes are agreed.

2.

MACA should formulate a strategy and multi-year plan for itself and the MAPA, covering:
o what it will do (e.g. continue operations reforms to achieve clearance targets)
o how it will:
• support the GoA in formulating a government strategy for assuming national
ownership of the mine action programme
• support the GoA to implement its strategy once it is in place
• assess progress towards its goals and objectives (i.e. a monitoring and evaluation
framework, plus a tentative schedule for evaluations)
o the pre-conditions required of ANDMA and, more generally, the GoA before launching a
concerted programme of support to the capacity development efforts of DMC and a
future national mine action authority
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3.

Accordingly, the GoA should formulate its strategy for mine action and the assumption of
national ownership. This should be based on:
o a forecast of the likely residual problem in 2013 (i.e. a needs analysis)
o decisions concerning the capacities (policy; regulation/coordination; operations/service
delivery) required to address this residual problem
o plans for key national organs (national authority; MAC)

4.

Donors should encourage the MACA and the GoA to join in a forum for:
o policy dialogue, to:
o encourage and support the GoA to formulate its national strategy for mine action
o encourage MACA to formulate ‘whole of government’ policies regarding
explosives contamination
o joint monitoring of progress on both the MACA strategy and, eventually, the GoA
national mine action strategy
o commissioning periodic joint evaluations of MACA, MAPA, and GoA progress in
developing its capacity and commitment for assuming ownership of the national mine
action programme.
This forum should normally meet every six months, although more frequent meetings should
take place until the GoA formulates its national mine action strategy and following any joint
evaluations. MACA should provide the secretariat services, and the presence of
representatives from UNMAS and, perhaps, UNOPS would be expected.

5.

CIDA should consider bolstering its own capacity to resume its role as the donor focal point
for mine action within the CG mechanism.

6.

MACA should consider strengthening its capacities for monitoring and evaluation of
demining by introducing a sustainable livelihoods approach in conjunction with, initially,
MCPA and in partnership with the Afghan Institute for Rural Development (AIRD – part of
MRRD). Secondary objectives of this effort would be capacity development for LIAT teams
plus the introduction of Afghan sustainable livelihoods and rural development specialists to
the field of mine action.

7.

CIDA and other donors should consider a separate project to strengthen the Afghan demining
NGOs, which have great capacity to contribute in other sectors (community development;
rural development; vocational training), subject to the following:
o one or more of the Afghan NGOs need to request such assistance
o the project should not be implemented by MACA or the UN
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INTRODUCTION
Background
This is a report of a mission to Afghanistan undertaken by the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD or the Centre) from 16 May – 5 June 2008. The original
rationale of the mission was to review the mine action sector and the projects funded by the
European Commission (EC), as part of the broader evaluation of EC-funded mine action projects
in the Caucuses-Central Asia. Discussions between the GICHD and the Afghanistan Task Force
(ATF) of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) led to a request that the
Centre also provide a report to CIDA on its assessment of the UN Mine Action Centre for
Afghanistan (MACA).
Terms of reference
The main purposes of this report are to (i) advise CIDA/ATF on what it should expect from the
UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)6 in terms of reporting on development results, and (ii) assess
feasible timelines and approaches for the transfer of UN responsibilities for mine action in
Afghanistan to national organs, capable of addressing the country’s future problems stemming
from explosives contamination.7 The specific objectives of the assessment relate to:
1. Donor coordination, particularly as this relates to the UNMAS/MACA exit strategy and
the emergence of national ownership;
2. Nationalisation, particularly with respect to the transition to full national ownership;
3. Mainstreaming components of mine action in support of reconstruction and development;
4. MACA capacity for monitoring and evaluation of development results, including gender.
The complete Terms of Reference are attached as Appendix 1.
Methodology
The mission began with a two-person team, comprising:
•
•

Ted Paterson, Head of Policy Research & Evaluation, GICHD
William Fryer, an independent consultant with a background in demining, who is
currently completing a masters degree in Post-Conflict Reconstruction at the University
of York

After the first week, they were joined by Faiz Paktian, an Afghan national with extensive
experience in UN mine action programmes, who now is Head of the International Mine Action
6

UNMAS (part of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations – DPKO) is the lead UN agency for
mine action, and assumes responsibility for UN mine action operations when (i) there are international
peacekeeping or UN-mandated security forces present, or (ii) when there is no national government in
place, or the government requests the UN to assume temporary responsibility for mine action. UNMAS
projects are implemented by the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS).
7
Explosives contamination comprises landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). In turn,
ERW includes unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned ordnance (AXO).
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Standards (IMAS) unit at GICHD.
The team conducted a review of background documents and, during its mission, met with
numerous people in Afghanistan representing:
•
•
•
•

CIDA and other donor agencies (EC, Germany, Japan)
MACA/UN agencies (UNMAS, UNOPS, UNDP, UNAMA)
Demining operators (Afghan and international NGOs; international firms)
Government officials

Two members of the team undertook a three-day visit to Bamyan – site of a large demining effort
in support of the broader reconstruction programme in that province – where they met the
Governor, other government officials, representatives from the Area Mine Action Centre
(AMAC) and the demining operator in the province, plus the New Zealand Provincial
Reconstruction Team.
The GICHD submitted a draft report at the end of June 2008. This report reflects comments on
the draft received from CIDA.
Report layout
The report is organised as follows:
•

•

•

•
•

Chapter 1 provides a background on Afghanistan, the nature and extent of its
explosives contamination problem, and a brief history of the Mine Action
Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA).
Chapter 2 outlines the current status of the MAPA, the MACA, Government of
Afghanistan (GoA) units involved in mine action, and government-donor
coordination mechanisms for mine action.
Chapter 3 provides the assessment team’s analysis vis-à-vis MACA and MAPA more
broadly, donor coordination, nationalisation, mainstreaming, and monitoring and
evaluation.
Chapter 4 provides our principal conclusions and recommendations.
Appendices provide the ToR for the assessment, the itinerary and list of people met,
and the list of documents consulted.
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1. BACKGROUND
CONFLICT AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN
KEY FEATURES OF THE HISTORY, SOCIETY, AND ECONOMY
At 647,500 km2 (about 50% larger than Iraq), Afghanistan is a mountainous and ethnically
diverse country. While estimates vary widely, the largest ethnic group among the estimated 28
million people is Pashtun (somewhere between 40 and 54%), followed in size by Tajik (30%+),
Hazara (8 to 15%), and Uzbek. The country’s borders cut through the traditional homelands of
many ethnic groups, leaving Pashtun divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Tajik
and Uzbek Afghans split from those in the Central Asian republics.
Efforts by successive national governments to exert effective authority over the country’s isolated
and diverse regions has remained a recurrent theme in Afghanistan’s political economy to this
day. The difficulties experienced by central governments have been magnified by interference
from neighbouring countries, often facilitated by the cross-border ethnic and religious affiliations,
which also bolster informal trade (i.e. smuggling), which further reinforces the split between the
central government and the regions.
Starting with the Soviet incursion in 1979, Afghanistan became a central theatre in the Cold War.
The conflict has taken its toll in the form of repeated and massive migrations of people plus the
growth of war economies (particularly, opium), which provide revenues and regional-ethnic
powerbases for insurgents and numerous warlords (or, more politely, “commanders”).
HISTORY OF CONFLICT
The 1979 Soviet invasion led governments in Muslim and Western countries to channel arms and
money to support the anti-communist forces, igniting a civil war. This displaced millions of
Afghans to Iran and Pakistan, which then provided bases for mujahideen factions. Fierce
resistance wore down the Soviet forces, who exited following the 1988 Geneva Accords.
Unfortunately, there was little acceptance of the Geneva Accords among the mujahideen and the
civil war continued. The pro-Soviet regime survived until 1992, abetted by the disunity of
mujahideen factions. While a government of sorts was formed in Kabul, it remained under
constant attack by other factions, reducing much of the capital to ruins.
The stalemate only ended with the sudden emergence of the Taliban movement. In late 1994 the
Taliban took Kandahar, followed by Herat in 1995 and Kabul in 1997. Some of the anti-Taliban
forces united under the Northern Alliance, retaining control of about 20% of the country. The
conflict between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban continued until late 2001, when the USled coalition threw its weight behind the former. By December 2001, Northern Alliance forces
had captured Kabul and most major centres, and the Afghanistan Interim Authority was installed.
However, the Taliban were not destroyed. Initially, much of the effort to eliminate the Taliban
was left in the hands of regional warlord/“commanders” financed by the US-led coalition. This
proved unsuccessful, forcing Canada and other NATO members to commit additional troops.
However, the Taliban has re-assumed de facto control over large areas of Afghanistan. Because
of this, enhanced security is the central issue in Afghanistan. It is far and away the principal
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concern of most Afghans and a pre-condition for revitalising the legitimate economy and for the
government to establish even a minimal degree of credibility. Evidence suggests that, initially,
this task was botched and security for most Afghans worsened.
Progress on the security/peace-building agenda requires wholesale reform of the country’s
security sector. A national army and police force have been established, but much more needs to
be done to train and equip these forces. As well, multiple militias must be demobilised and excess
arms and munitions destroyed.
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY, PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING
EVOLUTION OF A DEVELOPMENT COMPACT & STRATEGY
The political, economic and social development of Afghanistan represents an enormous challenge
for both the GoA and the international community. The latter is insufficiently equipped,
coordinated, and coherent8 to tackle such a complex task, and success ultimately depends on the
emergence of a reasonably capable and committed national government. The transition from
dependency on international actors to national ownership is fraught with problems due to real
differences in strategic approach that inevitably will emerge, plus the fact that the state apparatus
has limited capacity to plan and implement a multi-dimensional development effort.
GoA efforts to formulate its own development agenda and, ultimately, to assume ‘the driver’s
seat’, have been halting.9 A breakthrough of sorts was achieved at the London Conference in
early 2006, where the Afghan Compact was agreed between the GoA and the international
community. This set-out three ‘pillars of activity’ (1. security; 2. governance, rule of law, and
human rights; and 3. economic and social development) each with a variety of targets, along with
nine principals to guide implementation. The GoA also committed to “provide a prioritised and
detailed Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) with indicators for monitoring
results”. (p. 13)10
The ANDS11 was completed and approved by President Karzai in April 2008, and presented to
the International Conference in Support of Afghanistan held in Paris on 12 June (just after the
end of our mission to Afghanistan). Its broadest goals are to:
•
•
•

Achieve nationwide stabilization, strengthen law enforcement, and improve personal
security for every Afghan
Strengthen democratic practice and institutions, human rights, the rule of law, delivery of
public services, and government accountability
Reduce poverty, ensure sustainable development through a private sector-led market
economy, improve human development indicators, and make significant progress toward
achieving the MDGs

8

‘Coherence’ usually refers to how well the 3Ds – the defence, diplomacy, and development arms of each
government – work together on a complex problem.
9
Milestones were the National Development Framework (April 2002), Securing Afghanistan’s Future
(January 2004), and the Interim-Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS in January 2006).
10
The Government presented an Interim ANDS at the London Conference.
11
The ANDS also serves as Afghanistan’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, and was presented to the
joint boards of the IMF and World Bank in May 2008.
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Mine action falls into the Security pillar. The mine action targets are shown below:
Table 1 – Afghan Compact/ANDS Targets for Mine Action
Target
All stockpiled antipersonnel mines will be
located and destroyed by
20 March 2008

Indicator & status
• In October 2007, the GoA
announced the achievement of
the Ottawa Treaty obligation to
destroy all known stockpiles.

The area contaminated by
mines and unexploded
ordnance will be reduced
by 70% by the end of 2010
Clear 90% of all known
SHA by 1391 (2012)
Clear all emplaced antipersonnel mines by 1391
(1 March 2013) as per the
Ottawa Convention.

• Square meters of land released
as safe.
• The baseline is 720 million m2 of
suspected hazardous areas
(SHA), implying:
2
o 540 million m need to be
released by the end of 2010
o 648 million m2 by the end of
2012
2
o 720 million m by 1 March
2013

Comments
• Over 480,000 antipersonnel landmines
have been destroyed.
• Some stockpiles may not
have been located
• On target relative to the
baseline, however…
• New SHA continue to be
discovered.

As well, the ANDS notes that “A capacity to remove mines and ERWs beyond the 2013 MAPA
transition deadline probably will be needed.” (p. 55)
AID MANAGEMENT
Seeking to avoid some of the confusion created by the rush of donors into a fragile situation, the
World Bank pushed a comprehensive aid coordination mechanism in Afghanistan, and tried to
align this with the government’s priorities and ways of doing business. The mechanism went
through a number of modifications over the years. The structure in place at the time of our
mission (see Figure 1) had been agreed at the London Conference in early 2006, the same time as
the Afghan Compact.
This featured eight Consultative Groups (CG), each with a number of Working Groups reporting
to it, along with two ‘umbrella CGs’ and another five covering cross-cutting issues, all reporting
to the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB). The JCMB, comprising seven GoA and
21 international members, was the senior body for policy dialogue and joint problem solving,
serving as the ‘custodian of the Afghan Compact’.

ASSESSMENT OF UNMACA
VERSION 23.08.2008 | 5

Figure 1 – Consultative Group Structure 2006-mid 2008
Joint Coordination &
Monitoring Board (JCMB)

Oversight
Committee
JCMB Secretariat

CG 1
Security

CG 2

CG 3

CG 4

CG 5

CG 6

CG 7

CG 8

WG 1
Defence
25 other working groups
WG 2
Mine Action
Defence
WG 3
Police

Umbrella CGs (Poverty
Reduction; Aid Effectiveness)

Cross-cutting CGs – Gender; Counter Narcotics; Environment; Anticorruption; Regional cooperation

WG 4 DIAG

The mechanisms have always been too complex. At the Paris Conference in July 2008, the GoA
and its international partners agreed to keep the JCMB but to streamline the rest of the structure
as follows:12
Table 2 – New aid coordination mechanisms
Level
1

Body
JCMB

2

Standing
Committees

3

Task Forces

Roles
• main forum for joint policy formulation, problem solving and strategic
coordination
• ensure donor funds spent efficiently & in coordinated fashion
• promote mutual accountability
• ensure strategic priorities are set & adjusted with changing context
• one Committee per pillar:
o Security (includes mine action)
o Governance, Rule of Law, Human Rights
o Economic & Social Development
• support delivery & decision-making between full JCMB meetings
• set-up by Steering Committees to focus on specific priorities
• time-bound
• prepare policy papers & recommendations for Steering Committees

NATURE, EXTENT, AND IMPACT OF EXPLOSIVES CONTAMINATION
Explosives contamination in Afghanistan stems from:
12

JCMB co-chairs, Report on the Implementation of the Afghanistan Compact (for The International
Conference In Support Of Afghanistan, Paris, 12 June 2008).
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•
•
•
•
•

The Soviet intervention – 1979-89
The campaigns by the mujahideen against the Najibullah regime – 1989-92
The civil war among various mujahideen factions – 1992-95
The civil war between mujahideen factions and the Taliban – 1995-2001
The U.S.-led coalition campaign to overthrow the Taliban – 2001

As yet, no one has been able to provide a comprehensive assessment of the problem, for three
reasons:
•
•
•

The Afghanistan programme began when “humanitarian”13 demining was an emerging
discipline, with limited capacity to conduct systematic surveys;
Mine action personnel have rarely had secure access to the entire country;
Continued fighting resulted in new contamination.14
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Figure 2 – Landmine contamination by year implanted

The most comprehensive picture of the contamination was provided by the Afghan Landmine
Impact Survey (ALIS), completed in late 2004. It reduced the total suspected hazardous area
(SHA) remaining for clearance from about 850 km2 to 715 km2 (14%). However, the discovery of
new contamination plus slow updating of records led the remaining SHA figure to creep-up
again, reaching a maximum of 852 km2 in September 2007. It has fallen since, due both to
records clean-up and to more rapid ‘release’ of land suspected of contamination (an issue
discussed later), largely through enhanced survey activities.

13

In mine action, ‘humanitarian’ usually means simply ‘non-military’ and not for a commercial purpose.
Thus, humanitarian mine action may support broader humanitarian, reconstruction, peace-building, and
development programmes.
14
Recent reports suggest increased use of landmines by the Taliban in recent months.
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Figure 3 – the evolving contamination picture: area of SHA awaiting demining
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The ALIS also provided a new way of assessing the impact of contamination in Afghanistan. As
with LIS conducted in other countries, it focussed more on communities rather than individual
SHA and found that 2,368 communities (8% of all communities) – home to 4.2 million people
(15% of Afghanistan’s population) – were impacted by explosives contamination. Twelve
provinces accounted for 75% of the impacted communities, with Kabul and Parwan in the Central
Region being the most impacted. Almost 2,500 recent victims (i.e. within the two previous years)
were identified, of which 41% were fatalities.
HISTORY OF THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME FOR AFGHANISTAN
The evolution of MAPA can be divided into a number of phases:
•
•

•
•

Tentative beginnings (1988-90) – the initial, failed efforts by the UN and (more successfully)
international NGOs and to initiate mine action activities.
Establishment and expansion (1990-96) – the creation of the first ‘Afghan Mine Action
NGOs’ and the build-up of both the NGOs and the programme coordination mechanism,
based in Islamabad.
Relocating to Afghanistan (1996-2001) – the long process of relocating programme planning
and management functions from Pakistan to Afghanistan.
MAPA in the Post-Taliban era (2002-present) – the beginnings of real engagement with
legitimate national authorities and the broader international community active in post-Taliban
Afghanistan.

The MAPA is now entering a new phase, characterised by (i) a tighter focus on medium-term
performance targets and (ii) the need to transition to national ownership.
TENTATIVE BEGINNINGS: 1988-90
The signing of the Geneva Accords in 1988 led to optimistic predictions of impending peace and
the repatriation of millions of Afghan refugees, but it was apparent to many groups that
landmines represented a major impediment. The initial mine action work started in July 1988,
when HALO Trust began a small programme in Kabul. Shortly thereafter, the UN commenced its
mine action activities by (i) funding MRE for refugees, and (ii) using Western military personnel
ASSESSMENT OF UNMACA
VERSION 23.08.2008 | 8

to train thousands of refugees in basic clearance techniques. This effort was an abject failure.
ESTABLISHMENT & EXPANSION: 1990-96
Switching strategy, UNOCHA then decided to encourage the establishment of what have become
known as the Afghan Mine Action NGOs (although in fact these were established in Pakistan
under special registration provisions for Afghan “NGOs”15). The first of these – Afghan
Technical Consultants (ATC) – was created as a clearance organisation in October 1989,
followed by the Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), which specialised in minefield
survey and data base. The Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA), Organisation for Mine
Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR), and the Mine Dog and Detection Centre (MDC)
followed in subsequent years. Additional partners were added over time; most involved in MRE.
Because Afghanistan lacked a recognised government that controlled much territory beyond
Kabul, most international donors channelled funding via the UN to finance the Afghan mine
action NGOs. This has given the MACA16 great leverage and the programme has functioned
more like an industrial conglomerate than a network of independent organisations. The model
was successful in many ways and the programme expanded rapidly. By 1995 MAPA had about
2,000 demining personnel.
RELOCATING TO AFGHANISTAN: 1996-2002
In the anarchic conditions following the Soviet withdrawal, the MACA was based at the
UNOCHA office in Islamabad. MACA was a small operation, with only five international
personnel supported by a few locally engaged staff. However, because of the excellent
relationships between MACA and the Afghan NGOs, buttressed by UN control of the purse
strings, this small unit was able to coordinate the programme.
However, as different regions of the country evolved on diverse trajectories in the, the separation
of MACA and NGO headquarters in Pakistan from the work in Afghanistan became problematic.
Once security improved with the emergence of the Taliban in 1994, the Afghan NGOs opened
offices in Afghanistan. UNOCHA then established Area Mine Action Centres (AMAC) for
regional coordination. From the start these were staffed by Afghans – the first Afghans filling
reasonably senior roles within the MACA.
Inevitably, the seemingly never-ending crisis in Afghanistan led to donor fatigue. Contributions
began to falter. After averaging almost $20 million per year over the previous five years,
donations fell below $13.5 million in 2001, forcing staff retrenchments.

15

The term non-governmental organisation has no legal meaning in most countries, but these Afghan
organisations never have had the governance structures or independence which most knowledgeable people
would expect from a credible NGO.
16
The MACA has never been a legal entity; rather, it is a UN project (currently, an UNMAS project
executed by UNOPS).
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Figure 4 – Donations to MAPA 1989-2001
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It is uncertain whether donor support would have continued to decline had the world not changed
so dramatically on 11 September 2001. The initial impacts on MAPA of the US-led invasion later
in that year was the temporary cessation of activities and the theft of vehicles and equipment; but
the quick collapse of the Taliban regime heralded a renewed expansion for MAPA.
MAPA IN THE POST-TALIBAN PERIOD
The MAPA partners faced a daunting agenda once the Taliban regime collapsed in late-2001.
First they had to resume operations, requiring extensive re-equipping to replace the looted
equipment. They also had to undertake a rapid assessment of the new hazards stemming from
coalition bombing – particularly the unexploded cluster munitions.
Clearance priorities also needed to be altered, both to deal with the cluster bombs and to address
the temporary population movements from the return of displaced persons to their home
communities. The MRE programme had to be overhauled, with women instructors re-engaged
and programmes to reach refugee camps and transit centres. Large-scale reconstruction projects,
particularly roads and airports, also required demining support.
The installation of the interim government also meant the end of the UNOCHA mandate, and the
UN transferred MACA to UNMAS. As well, MACA had to move from Islamabad to Kabul just
as hundreds of other aid agencies, embassies, and NGOs were establishing offices in the capital.
New units also had to be added to the MACA establishment to handle the administrative, finance,
and logistics functions previously provided by UNOCHA in Islamabad. The number of
international positions more than doubled to over 20.
MACA and its implementing partners responded effectively to the challenges, while donors
quickly provided funding to expand operations. Funding in 2002 increased almost fivefold to
over $65 million and, in 2003, total receipts exceeded $75 million, with funding for
reconstruction rising to almost a quarter of the total. In addition, MAPA agencies – in particular,
HALO Trust – made significant contributions to the Disarmament, Demobilisation and
Reintegration (DDR) programme by destroying stockpiles of weapons, ammunition, and mines.
On 28 July 2002, President Karzai announced that Afghanistan would sign the Ottawa
Convention and, in March 2003, Afghanistan became a State Party to the Convention. The UN
and the Afghan authorities also discussed the eventual need to transfer responsibility for the
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MAPA. However, MACA has remained the de facto organ managing the mine action programme
on behalf of both the government and donors.
No government-donor coordination group for mine action was established as part of the initial
Consultative Group (CG) mechanism created in 2002. However, the Mine Action Consultative
Group (MACG) was formed under the chairmanship of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)
when the CG expanded in 2003. Among other things, the MACG developed a consensus on the
main features of a nationally-managed programme – in brief, the national authority should be a
semi-autonomous statutory body under an inter-ministerial committee reporting via the Office of
the President.17 However, MACA made little headway until 2007 on developing concrete plans
for the transfer of responsibility to national officials.
There were a number of reasons for the lack of progress. First, most agreed the mine action
programme was working comparatively well. Second, mine action was well down the list of
Government priorities. Third, demining support was essential for many reconstruction projects:
why take the risk of major changes when service disruptions could be such a problem? Finally,
there was no consensus within the GoA concerning which ministry should take the lead role in
mine action.
While recognising these problems in getting a clear government decision on the future
architecture for the national mine action programme, it is less understandable why more was not
achieved in nationalising the MACA staff complement. AMAC managers had always been
Afghan, but none of the management positions in MACA headquarters were held by Afghans.
Particularly frustrating was the fact that the Deputy Programme Manager position in MACA
(which was designated for an Afghan) remained vacant for over two years.
Finally, in mid-2007 UNMAS created a new senior management structure at the MACA, and
appointed Dr. Haider Reza – the former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs who had chaired that
MACG in 2003-05 – as Programme Manager. Shortly thereafter, another Afghan was appointed
Operations Manager, responsible for the largest unit within MACA.
Soon after he was appointed, Dr. Reza initiated informal discussions within the GoA to seek a
clear decision concerning the body that should be the government focal point for mine action.
These efforts led to national mine action symposium in December 2007, involving government
ministries, donors, implementing partners, UN agencies, etc. This decided that an interministerial body (ICB) should be established to arrive at a decision and, on 16 January 2008, the
ICB met and selected the Department of Mine Clearance as the lead government agency for mine
action. Progress since that date is discussed in the following chapter.
BENEFITS FROM MINE ACTION
Evidence of MAPA’s Socio-economic Benefits
In the late 1990s, two major studies were initiated in an attempt to document the socio-economic
benefits of mine action. The first of these (the Socio-Economic Impact Survey – SEIS) was
conducted by MCPA (the Afghan NGO which at that time focussed on survey and information
management). The second effort – the Socio-economic Impact of Mine Action in Afghanistan
17

Through a long process of consultation with stakeholders, MACA developed draft legislation to create
the body, but this was never presented to the legislature.
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(SIMAA) – was launched by the World Bank and used established cost-benefit techniques.
In broad terms, the results of the two studies were remarkably similar. Both found significant net
socio-economic benefits, both in the range of $30+ million in benefits for about $20 million (the
annual cost of the programme in 1999). In detail, however, the findings could not have been more
different. The SEIS concluded that almost 70% of the benefits from mine action stemmed from
grazing land and, more broadly, livestock. Conversely, the SIMAA found less than 3% of total
benefits came from clearing grazing land. Instead, over 60% of total benefits came from clearing
crop land, with substantial benefits also accruing from the clearance of irrigation works and
roads. What could account for such different conclusions concerning the same programme?
Figure 5 – Estimated distribution of benefits from demining
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It is clear that MCPA personnel did not have the expertise to analyse the data in appropriate costbenefit terms. On the other hand, the authors of the World Bank study did not have adequate data
on farming systems to capture how valuable livestock is for rural livelihoods. Clearing grazing
land will never provide a net economic benefit on its own, but sustainable livelihoods for many
rural households and communities probably requires access to adequate grazing land.
These examples simply illustrate how difficult it is to quantify the socio-economic benefits of
mine action. Cost-benefit analysis is valuable, but inadequate by itself for developing a clear
understanding of the negative impacts of landmine contamination or the benefits of addressing
that contamination. Such studies need to be supplemented by more in-depth research on farming
systems and sustainable livelihoods – a point we will return to later in this report.
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2. CURRENT STATUS OF MINE ACTION
THE MINE ACTION CENTRE FOR AFGHANISTAN (MACA)
MACA currently has an approved establishment of over 470 positions,18 of which 21 are
international. The majority of the staff are in Operations, which includes seven AMAC and one
sub-AMAC. After focussing on programme expansion and then consolidation in the five years
since the ousting of the Taliban, in 2007 MACA began instituting wide-ranging changes to its
management team and organisational structure, its strategy for operations and the coordination
‘levers’ to implement this strategy, and its approach to the transition to national authority. Some
of these changes represent new directions (e.g. operations reforms) and are in the early stages of
implementation: other changes (relating to, for example, MRE and VA) are evolutions building
on progress achieved over some years.
Figure 6 – MACA organigram19
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Security (7)
Chief of
Staff

Programme
Dept. (11)

Technical
Coord. (11)

Public Info
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Dept. (261)

MIS
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AFL (88)
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MRE (9)
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(3)
MoLSAMD
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Finance & Logistics
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with MoE, MoPH, MoLSAMD, plus ARCS
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Shaded boxes depict posts held or
departments headed by Afghans

In mid-2007, Dr. Haider Reza, an Afghan, was appointed MACA Programme Director. Shortly
thereafter, an Afghan was also appointed Operations Manager. Thus, for the first time, key posts
in MACA headquarters have been nationalised.
18

Eighty-five of the national posts were vacant at the time of the mission.
The organigram is straightforward, except perhaps the function of the ‘Programme Department’, which
covers the management of contracts with implementing partners, the preparation of proposals, and
tracking/reporting on funds from UN and bilateral sources.
19
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MACA has also supported efforts by government ministries and the Afghan Red Crescent
Society (ARCS) to strengthen their capacities to assume responsibility for MRE and services to
persons with disabilities. These efforts have started to bear fruit within the past two years,20 and
in 2007 MACA signed MoUs with three ministries as well as the ARCS and ICRC to ensure this
progress continues. MACA is now in the process of establishing a Transitions Unit to manage its
partnerships with the three ministries and with ARCS.
Textbox 1 – MACA Transitions Unit
MACA has established a transition unit under the Director’s office* to manage the transition to
national responsibility for the MRE and VA components. To facilitate this, MACA has signed
three-year memoranda of understanding (MoU) with:
•
•
•
•

Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD)
Ministry of Education (MoE)
Ministry of Public Health (MoPH)
Afghanistan Red Crescent Society (ARCS)

During the transition, the MACA will fund an advisor in each of the ministries to assist with policy
development and capacity enhancement. This will allow the mainstreaming of MRE and Disability
into ministry policies and programmes.
The MoE has made MRE a cross-cutting issue in its new curriculum (along with gender,
narcotics, corruption, and the environment). These issues will be incorporated into the new
national curriculum in 2009. New textbooks incorporating MRE messages were issued in 2008.**
MACA has been working with ARCS since 2006 to allow the phase-out of ‘direct delivery’ MRE.
In 2007, MACA and ICRC signed a tri-partite MoU with ARCS to support its capacity to assume
responsibility for residual risks. ARCS has already assumed responsibility in the North and Northeast, and MACA plans to stop support of direct delivery MRE in the East within the coming year.
Disability is a major problem in Afghanistan (a survey conducted by Handicap International (HI)
showed that 2.7% of the population are severely disability***). Accordingly, Disability Support
Units (DSU) have been set up in the MoPH and MoLSAMD. An Afghan consultant has been
assigned by MACA to both DSU, with additional staff provided by the ministries. Both ministries
are developing policies to ensure people with disabilities can access their services.
The MACA provides additional support to the ministries to enable representatives to attend
regional forums to share information and to network with other countries in the region.
* ToRs have been issued for a permanent member of the Transition Unit, which should be approved by midJuly 2008
** MACA will continue activities targeting the estimated 2 million children who do not attend formal education
in Afghanistan.
*** The census now planned for 2010 is expected to include a number of questions on disability.

Since his arrival, Dr. Reza also pushed for a clear decision concerning the government focal point
for mine action, which led to the designation of the Department for Mine Clearance (DMC) – a
subject covered in a subsequent section of this chapter.
20
The GICHD officer responsible for assisting countries in developing strategies for disability programmes
(including landmine victims’ assistance) reports that Afghanistan is one of the two ‘stars’ among the 24
countries she has surveyed or assisted.
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THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME FOR AFGHANISTAN (MAPA)
MAPA is far more than MACA alone, and comprises over 20 distinct organisations supported by
donor contributions averaging about $60 million per year since 2002. A number of these
organisations (particularly the Afghan and international demining NGOs) are extremely large;
some with thousands of staff. These have operated successfully for a decade or more in a
challenging environment, and are extremely capable by any reasonable standards, and certainly
within the context of Afghanistan today.
Figure 7 – Contributions to MAPA since 2002
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Programme expenditures peaked in 2004-05, when very substantial sums were spent on demining
for reconstruction projects (roads, airports, power lines).21 The drop in expenditures, coupled with
the fact that international demining firms have entered the country22 and now obtain the lion’s
share of tasks in support of reconstruction projects, led to a significant cut-back in the staff of the
Afghan demining NGOs (over 1,750 staff, or 27% of their peak employment levels).
Figure 8 – Estimated MAPA expenditures since 2002
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Demining accounts for the bulk of programme expenditures, and the basic performance metrics
for it are (i) area cleared and (ii) devices destroyed. These measures have fluctuated significantly
21

Demining expenditures relating to road reconstruction are estimated at $50 million from 2003-06, while
demining at Kabul airport cost another $7 million.
22
At least six international firms are accredited for demining, along with a smaller number of Afghan
firms.
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over the past years (see graphs). The fact that significant proportions of demining was done in
support of road and other infrastructure work may account for the divergent pattern in areas
cleared versus landmines destroyed from 2003-06. In brief, large areas were reported as cleared
in that period, but the number of landmines destroyed was on a declining trend.23
Figure 9 – Landmine clearance achievements (quarterly averages for year)
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Obviously, these patterns mean that fewer landmines are being found in each km2 that is
demined, as is depicted in the following graph.
Figure 10 – Landmines destroyed per km2 cleared
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Starting in 2007, MACA introduced a number of operations reforms that appear to have reduced
the trend. So far this year, operators have destroyed almost 2,000 landmines per km2, over five
23

This is common when more demining is done for reconstruction. For roads, power lines, etc., large areas
are ‘cleared’ by survey and spot clearance, so square meters goes up while the number of devices/m2 falls.
24
Quarterly averages are presented rather than annual totals so that the figures for 2008 are comparable
with those in earlier years.
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2008

times more than in 2006 and a ratio not achieved since the early 1990s.25
OPERATIONS REFORMS
While MACA and its MAPA partners did a good job in expanding and then consolidating
operations in the five years following the fall of the Taliban, they were slow in introducing
demining innovations in the global industry. Starting in 2007, MACA has introduced a number of
reforms to catch-up, and is formulating its own innovations to cope with the specific challenges –
in particular, insecurity plus the scope of the contamination within a diverse country – within
Afghanistan.
‘Full service’ demining NGOs
A number of the Afghan demining NGOs were established to perform quite distinct roles –
MCPA for survey; META (now defunct) for QA and training; MDC to breed, train, and supply
mine detection dogs (MDD) plus handlers to the survey and clearance NGOs. In brief, these
NGOs provided complementary services and operated more like a conglomerate (with MACA as
the headquarters) than as independent entities.
With the expansion of the programme since the mid-1990s, MACA had to provide ever more
‘headquarters services’ to coordinate operations, leading to the establishment of AMACs, which
further ‘UN-ised’ the programme and progressively reduced the independence of the Afghan
NGOs. Coordination costs came to dominate the benefits of specialisation. The model became
cumbersome and made it increasingly difficult to determine responsibility for either successes
(everyone was responsible!) or failures (no one was responsible!). It also complicated the
introduction of demining innovations from elsewhere because two or three organisations were
involved in every demining task.
Over the past two years, MACA has promoted the shift to ‘full service’ demining NGOs, each
with survey and clearance capacities and a range of tools (manual, mechanical, dogs). This means
that only one organisation is assigned to a task, and each organisation can introduce innovations
without disrupting the policies and procedures of others.
Enhanced survey process
Mine action is highly dependent on both ‘big picture’ and ‘micro’ surveys to obtain both
technical data (i.e. on contamination) and socio-economic data (the impacts of contamination and
demining). Such data is essential for planning and prioritisation, and to provide an account of
results achieved. Good survey capabilities do not guarantee a good demining programme
(because survey data may not be analysed to inform decision-makers), but a good demining
programme invariably implies good survey (and information management) capabilities. MACA
has introduced a number of changes to survey processes since the ALIS in 2003-05.
Land Impact Assessment Teams (LIAT)

An LIS is an expensive exercise that can only provide a snapshot of the contamination and, more
particularly, its impact on communities. Most of the LIS surveys conducted worldwide have
become less useful over time as no mechanism was created to update the data (i.e. on a ‘rolling’
rather than a ‘campaign’ basis). In April 2007, MACA and MCPA established 16 x 3 person
LIAT teams to provide such a mechanism. Employed by MCPA but tasked by the AMAC, the
25

The change in trend appears to be more than would be explained purely by the reduction in demining for
reconstruction.
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LIAT teams conduct both pre-clearance and post-clearance assessments.
•

•

pre-clearance, teams visit communities to update information on each suspected
hazardous area (SHA), sometimes cancelling an SHA (e.g. the community now actively
uses it)26 or modifying its area, so the data in IMSMA reflects the current status27
post-clearance assessments are to determine if demined land is being used for the
expected purpose and by the intended beneficiaries (discussed later in more detail)

Polygon survey

In 2008, half of the LIAT surveyors have been provided some technical training to allow them to
convert SHA (depicted as circles) into more precise polygons (i.e. the suspected shape and area
of the SHA – see figure), which often results in a reduction in the recorded area of the SHA.
Figure 11 – Polygon survey
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The remaining LIAT teams will be cross-trained to conduct polygon survey in 2008.
Demining reforms
MACA has also pushed to get the Afghan demining NGOs to update their standing operating
procedures (SOP) to introduce innovations that have proved successful in other countries.
One-man drill

Until recently, Afghan demining NGOs used a ‘two-man drill’28 – two deminers worked in one
clearance lane, with one using the detector and the second observing as a QA measure. With a
one-man drill, only one deminer works a lane. This requires more mine detectors, and requires
rest periods (in a two-man drill, the ‘observer’ is also resting). Tests in Afghanistan (where
26

Over 325 minefields and other SHA were cancelled in 2007 because of local use, the determination that
false information had been provided, or further investigation by LIAT teams.
27
LIAT teams also receive reports of new SHA.
28
This is the term used in the demining industry and, in Afghanistan, correctly reflects the gender mix of
the demining corps – 100% male.
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HALO Trust has long used a one-man drill) and elsewhere suggest productivity increases of 30%
can be expected.
Smaller teams

Traditionally, Afghan demining NGOs organised personnel into large teams, which reduced
logistical and site management issues and (conceivably) enhanced security. A problem, however,
is that large teams cannot deploy efficiently on small minefields (safety distances are required
between clearance lanes because of the risk of explosions). Teams have now been reduced to 16
persons (each with 10-12 deminers), which can be split into two sections to deploy on smaller
tasks or so one section can respond to a report of UXO in the vicinity. All deminers have also
been cross-trained in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), which means they can deal with
bombs, artillery shells, etc. rather than simply the less technically-sophisticated landmines.
Integrated demining

Traditionally, survey teams would visit an SHA in advance of a clearance team to conduct either:
•

•

a task planning survey (i.e. mark the boundaries of the area to be cleared; check on
vegetation cover, soil type, types of explosive devices expected; etc.) to ensure the
clearance team had the right tools to complete the task safely and efficiently;
technical survey – as above, but also intruding into the hazard area to try and discover the
pattern of mines and to reduce the area as much as possible.29

With better equipment and additional training, the smaller demining teams can deploy to an SHA
and start immediately with technical survey, shifting immediately into the clearance drill once the
pattern of mines is discovered. Land which is outside the pattern of mines (plus a safety buffer) is
then checked quickly (e.g. with dogs, machines, or sample survey) and released as ‘no apparent
risk’ if no indications of additional devices are discovered (see diagram for simplified depiction).
Initial tests suggest that an average of perhaps 30% of SHA can be released as ‘no apparent risk’
using risk assessment measures costing one- to two-thirds as much as full clearance. This
approach requires good team leaders who have the discretion to make their own decisions based
on findings on the ground.

29

As yet there is no standardisation in the definitions of such surveys. Some organisations will say they
conduct technical surveys, but in fact do not intrude into the hazard areas.
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Figure 12 – Integrated technical survey, clearance, and risk assessment
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Revised criteria for setting priorities
MACA has also revised the set of criteria it uses for determining priorities, as follows:
•

•

Criteria for resource allocation (e.g. which areas of the country will have what assets)
o ‘Low-hanging fruit’ (districts with few SHA that can be declared mine impact
free30 after a demining season)
o Highly contaminated districts
o Highly impacted communities
o Areas with special cultural or other benefits (e.g. Bamyan, or areas benefiting
from integrated rural development programmes)
o Opportunities for service delivery to insecure areas
Task priorities
o Addressing the ‘killing fields’ (i.e. the minority of minefields that cause repeated
accidents)
o ‘Low hanging fruit’ – small hazards that were not cleared previously by the large
clearance teams

30

It would be inappropriate to declare most such districts as ‘mine free’ as new minefields continue to be
discovered (e.g. once they impact an expanding community).
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o

Hazards within 500m proximity of the community

Regionalisation of operators
MACA has also requested31 the various demining operators to reallocate their assets in one or
two regions of the country (e.g. ATC largely in the central region; OMAR in the East and West;
etc.). This is feasible now that the these NGOs are ‘full-service’ operators, and should simplify
logistics and coordination, plus reduce the costs of maintaining regional offices.
New business model
MACA has also just introduced a series of measures that, together, constitute a new ‘business
model’ for the demining financed via the UN. This has three inter-related components:
1. ‘projectisation’ – bundling tasks into a single project for a demining season or longer, and
awarding the entire project via a request for proposal (RFP) mechanism (either open or
restricted). Examples include:
o projects covering entire districts (e.g. those with few SHA) or clusters of highly
impacted communities – the first of these have just been awarded following an RFP
o demining services in insecure areas – MACA has just requested proposals from the
Afghan NGOs for community-based demining32 pilot projects in insecure areas.
These are not directly competitive – each NGO has been asked for a proposal for
areas in which they have strong roots (e.g. DAFA in the South; OMAR in the East),
which should allow them to operate with some degree of security once local leaders
assure the NGO of their consent
2. the introduction of greater competition
o open RFP inviting proposals from accredited firms and NGOs for projects in
reasonably secure areas
o restricted RFP inviting proposals from NGOs with adequate ‘grounding’ in insecure
areas, with funding provided to the soundly conceived proposals
3. switching from ex ante to ex post control – a change from controlling inputs and activities to
paying for outputs that have met quality assurance standards. This will allow the NGOs to
manage without seeking prior approval from MACA for every variance from plan.
Collectively, these changes could pay handsome dividends, but there are risks. Statements of
work in the RFP must be soundly conceived and contracts must be well written and enforced.
There are additional burdens placed on the Quality Management functions. The Afghan NGOs
have significant political power which they could mobilise should they feel they are being treated
unfairly. Perhaps the most significant risk is that years of paternalism and micro-management by
MACA has stunted some of the capabilities of the Afghan NGOs, or left these undeveloped
because they were unneeded (e.g. proposal-writing skills; fund-management).33
31

As the UN funds most of these through the VTF, MACA has significant leverage in this regard.
MAPA has previously used the community-based approach in the Mine Action for Peace programme
(using demobilised combatants) and, earlier, in projects run by AREA – a community development NGO
(now defunct). The concept is to hire many local residents as guards, labourers, and (following training)
deminers, which will give local communities the incentive to provide as much security as they can.
33
These risks are real. AREA – both a demining and community development NGO – went bankrupt in
2004 following the surge in its funding from multiple donors, who also hired AREA’s most capable staff
by offering salaries many times higher than the NGO paid. Reportedly, at least half of the 10 largest
32
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However, the new business model promises a number of benefits, the chief of which are:
o
o

o

service delivery in insecure areas, which will lessen the impact of contamination on the
communities and could make an important contribution to peace-building
the NGOs will be stimulated by greater competition to enhance their capabilities and
become more successful while, at the same time, achieving greater independence. This
will be a great boon as the transition to government responsibility for the policy and
coordination functions is likely to go through rocky periods, and strong, independent
NGOs could make all the difference through difficult stages
efficiencies over time, as the poorly managed organisations shrink, releasing resources to
the better managed ones.34

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES INVOLVED IN MINE ACTION
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA)
MFA was designated the lead ministry for mine action following the country’s accession to the
APMBC and for a number of years did an excellent job in chairing the Mine Action CG and in
representing Afghanistan in international forums. However, as is often the case in fragile states,
commitment hinges on a small number of champions, and when the Deputy Minister moved to
another position, mine action was no longer a priority for MFA.
International experience suggests that foreign affairs ministries should not hold overall
responsibility for mine action in a mine-affected country – they often do a good job in
international representation, but do poorly on the oversight of programme policy and
implementation.35 However, participation in the Ottawa process is important for Afghanistan, so
MFA should certainly be a part of the national mine action authority in the future.
DEPARTMENT FOR MINE CLEARANCE (DMC)
DMC was established initially in 1989 via a Mukharai or executive order of the Najibullah
regime. It was to be under an inter-ministerial committee comprising National Security, Defence,
and Interior, but this never functioned so DMC was appended to the Disaster Preparedness
Department. It has remained in existence ever since, although with scant resources and, hence,
modest capacity. However, it’s role as the government focal point for mine action was reaffirmed at the meeting of the Inter-Ministerial Body in January this year.36 Accordingly, MACA
invited DMC to collocate and, in May, the department moved into the MACA compound.
DMC is now part of the proposed Afghan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA),37
which itself will be under an inter-ministerial committee chaired by the 2nd Vice-President. DMC
Afghan development NGOs went bankrupt about the same time for similar reasons, although in most cases
these were resuscitated by donors who needed them to manage projects.
34
This is probably the source of the biggest potential cost benefit from competition but, elsewhere, the lack
of donor coordination has muted this benefit as donors tend to prop-up their ‘favourites’.
35
See, for example, GICHD (2005) Review of Ten Years of Mine Action in Mozambique.
36
This decision effectively spelt the end of the scheme envisaged in the draft mine action legislation in
which a semi-autonomous agency would be established under an inter-ministerial committee, reporting to
the Office of the President.
37
We understand the legislation to establish this statutory body has not yet been laid before the legislature.
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reports directly to the ANDMA Director. It has about 10 managerial and technical officers, plus
support staff, all based in Kabul. ANDMA itself has seven zonal offices, which could provide
administrative support for any DMC activities outside Kabul (although, in practice, DMC liaises
with the larger and better-equipped AMACs).
The Director of DMC understands that it will be part of a transition process lasting until 2013, at
which point it will assume decision-making authority for the national mine action programme.
Details of this transition are unclear to all, but the DMC Director sees no need to rush; rather, he
understands there will be a three to four months period during which both DMC and MACA will
assess one another and discuss options. At some point, the draft mine action legislation would
then be amended to reflect the selected option.
While starved of resources, DMC clearly has some capacity, and the staff have sound knowledge
of public service policies and procedures. However, success in capacity development hinges on a
champion within DMC who can drive the process forward, and it is unclear whether such a
person is present within the current staff complement.38
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (MOE)
MACA has been working with the MoE for some time and, in mid-2007, signed an MoU with it
(whose Minister is committed to covering MRE and rights of the disabled issues via both the
curriculum and the child protection unit). MACA now has a local TA in MoE to assist with
curriculum development – grades 1-6 are complete and they are working on grades 7-12. In
addition, MACA provides training (covering MRE and disability issues) to personnel in the
Ministry’s child protection unit, as well as materials which child protection officers have already
used to train 12,000 teachers on MRE (the final target is 18,000 teachers).
MACA also has provided modest assistance for the MoE public education unit, education and
training TV, and a magazine covering inclusive education among other issues. MACA also
includes people from the provincial Departments of Education on various monitoring missions.
In brief, cooperation between MACA and the MoE is good and fruitful, and the Ministry is
committed to assuming responsibilities on such issues as MRE and inclusive education. MACA
support to the Ministry’s efforts is modest but effective.
MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH
The MoPH is responsible for providing medical care and physical rehabilitation services to
people with disabilities, including landmine survivors, and has established a Disability Unit under
the Director General of Primary Health Care/Essential Services.
The MACA began its engagement with the MoPH after the Nairobi Action Plan was agreed at the
first Five Year Review Conference of the APMBC, held in 2004. This clearly stated that
assistance to landmine survivors should be delivered as part of a broader programme to assist
people with disabilities rather than via standalone projects.39 Accordingly, the MACA and
38

While the assessment team was, in general, favourably impressed with the level of knowledge and
interest of DMC staff, we were troubled in particular by the fact that the Director has never managed the
departmental budget and no knowledge of the contents of the budget other that staff salaries and
emoluments.
39
At the time, Dr. Reza – then with MoFA – was co-chair of the APMBC Standing Committee on Victim
ASSESSMENT OF UNMACA
VERSION 23.08.2008 | 23

UNICEF produced a draft plan of action on disability to present at the States Parties meeting in
Zagreb (2005) and subsequently organised national workshops in August 2006 and November
2007. These efforts led to closer engagement with the MoPH and the broader disability
community, who have worked together on a series of updates to the disability action plan.
In mid-2007, the MoPH and UNOPS (on behalf of MACA) signed an MoU with the goal of
ensuring that disability rehabilitation services are integrated into both the Basic Package of
Health Services and the Essential Package of Hospital Services. The MACA provides modest
financial assistance and pays for an Afghan technical advisor who serves as the Coordinator of
the Disability Unit in the MoPH. This individual also assists with:
•

•

capacity development (e.g. development of curricula for training physiotherapist and
orthopaedic technicians and recognition of these qualifications within the MoPH;
inclusion of disability topics in the training of Community Health Workers)
meetings of the national disability taskforce and the Community-Based Rehabilitation
network

On its side, the MoPH has recognised its role in the implementation of APMBC obligations
related to landmine survivors.
The partnership is working well, with good progress made.
MINISTRY OF LABOUR, SOCIAL AFFAIRS, MARTYRS AND DISABLED
MoLSAMD is responsible for addressing social stigmatisation of persons with disabilities,
including landmine survivors. As such, the MACA has encouraged the Ministry to participate in
the efforts to develop a national action plan for disability programmes. MoLSAMD and UNOPS
(on behalf of MACA) have signed an MoU similar to those with MoPH and MoE with goals to:
•
•
•
•

support the implementation and monitoring of advocacy, awareness and social support
services;
chair the NGO coordination unit and the inter-ministerial coordination group on
disability
support disabled person’s organisations
advise on inclusive employment efforts

For its part, the MACA provides modest financial assistance and pays for an Afghan technical
advisor who serves as the Coordinator of the Disability Unit, which reports to the Deputy
Minister for Disability Affairs.
Again, the partnership seems to be working well, and progress is being made.
DONOR SUPPORT AND COORDINATION FOR MINE ACTION
There has been significant donor support to mine action in Afghanistan in recent years. Records
compiled by MACA show MAPA organisations received a total in excess of USD 345 million
from 2002 to 2006-07. The U.S. was the principal donor, accounting for 25% of the total,
Assistance.
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followed by the EC and Japan (both 15%). Canada provided about 10% of the total funding.
Figure 13 – Funding to MAPA organisations
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Approximately one-quarter of all funds went directly to an implementing organisation, while the
remainder was channelled via the UNMAS Voluntary Trust Fund or other UN mechanisms.
For some time in the post-Taliban period, donor coordination via the Mine Action Consultative
Group (MACG – later renamed the Mine Action Working Group – MAWG) was relatively
effective. The departure of the first MACG Chair (Dr. Haider Reza) from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, coupled with the rotation of key aid agency staff from Kabul, led to a decline in the
effectiveness of donor coordination, as well as coordination between the government and donors.
It is too early to assess the impact of the recent re-vamping of the aid coordination mechanisms –
including the elimination of the MAWG.
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3. ANALYSIS OF KEY ISSUES
THE MACA AND MAPA
In the three years following the ousting of the Taliban, MACA was stretched to the limit to
relocate to Afghanistan, resume and then expand the programme, conduct the Afghan LIS, and
support the emergency reconstruction programme. It was able to consolidate its operations over
2005-07, but achieved little in terms of introducing demining innovations, nationalisation of
senior positions, or broadening GoA commitment to national responsibility. The combined efforts
of MACA and most other mine action stakeholders to obtain Government commitment to a
suitable institutional architecture for a national mine action programme were unsuccessful.
Over the past year, progress has accelerated on a number of fronts. There are risks that progress
could be stopped or even reversed (e.g. tensions between MACA and the Afghan NGOs relating
to some of the operations reforms), but the outlook is positive.
POTENTIAL IMPACT OF OPERATIONS REFORMS
MACA has assumed responsibility for achieving the mine action targets laid-out in the Afghan
Compact and the ANDS. Meeting these will require performance improvements, and the MACA
has introduced a number of operations reforms. The potential impact of these reforms, in
combination, is very significant, and can be summarized as follows:
1. Efficiency/cost effectiveness gains
o Reduction in area requiring demining:
o Polygon survey  30+% cancellation/land release
o Integrated demining  30+% area reduction
o thus, on average, only about half of SHA area [70%*70%] will need demining
o Reduction in demining costs
o One-man drill  up to 30% increase in efficiency
o Risk reduction measures on the land released via area reduction  cost perhaps ½ as
much as full clearance
o Regionalisation  up to a 15% reduction in overall operations costs
o Overall, almost 65% reduction in unit costs ($/m2 released) is conceivable
2. Flexibility gains
o Smaller teams  can clear many small minefields (low-hanging fruit) that, until now,
teams drove by
o Full-service demining NGOs  fewer coordination challenges
3. Clarifying responsibilities
o Competition & ‘projectisation’ – operators responsible for operations/regulator
responsible for monitoring
o Potential efficiency gains as weaker organisations forced to improve or disappear
NATIONALISATION & NATIONAL OWNERSHIP
Broadly, nationalisation implies both (i) placing nationals in decision-making roles within the
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mine action programme, and (ii) placing the mine action programme under the control of national
institutions (laws and organs; budget systems; etc.). We will use the term ‘national ownership’ to
refer to this second aspect.
In terms of the former, Afghans have always played a central role in the delivery of mine action
services. However, it has long puzzled observers that, given the large and capable Afghan
operators and the large number of capable Afghans working on mine action internationally, no
Afghans were in management positions at MACA headquarters.40
As well, MACA stated it had an 18-month plan for transition to national ownership in 2003; fiftyfour months later it had not yet reached the starting line for implementing this 18-month plan.
Part of the reason for this seeming lack of progress was that the transition to national ownership
was often viewed in very narrow terms – the enactment of a law to establish a statutory body for
mine action that then could develop capacity to operate effectively outside the confines of
Afghanistan’s dysfunctional public service. This overlooked, for example, the fact that progress
could be, and has been made on progressively transferring responsibilities for certain mine action
components (in Afghanistan’s case, MRE and VA).
Regardless, over the past year or so, progress has resumed, both in terms of nationalisation (of
decision-making) and the emergence of national ownership. Fruitful partnerships have evolved
between MACA and the Ministries of Education, Public Health, and (to a lesser extent) Labour,
Social Affairs, Martyrs, and Disabled. The transition to national responsibility for MRE and
Victim Assistance (as part of disability programming) is well underway.
In the past year, the MACA has also made important progress in nationalising key positions.
Traditionally, the AMAC managers were Afghans but foreign personnel held all the senior posts
at MACA headquarters. Last June, Dr. Reza was appointed as Director of MACA, and since then
Afghans have been appointed to Chief of Operations and other key posts.
NATIONAL ORGANS
The DMC has been identified as the government focal point for mine action, and DMC has
collocated with MACA. This will allow MACA to assess DMC’s current capacities and whether
its managers are capable of envisaging the long-term capacity requirements and successfully
championing a capacity development process.41
It is unclear to the assessment team whether members of the inter-ministerial body (IMB) that
affirmed the DMC role were aware of the basic institutional requirements of a national mine
action programme (see textbox) – a national authority to set policy (for MRE and VA in addition
to demining!); a mine action centre (MAC) to coordinate the implementation of policy; and
operators to deliver the various mine action services.
We understand the DMC would eventually assume the role of the MAC. However, we do not see
a commitment has been made that the IMB would serve as the national mine action authority
because:
40

One has to note that the country director of the largest international demining NGO – HALO Trust – has
long been an Afghan.
41
We understand that the Director of ANAMA is expecting a recommendation from MACA concerning
the type of people needed by DMC to start the capacity development process in earnest.
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o

o
o

the IMB was an ad hoc initiative, so it cannot safely be assumed this is a government
decision (i.e. Cabinet could overturn the decision if, say, the Minister of Defence put it
on the Cabinet agenda)
the IMB has only met once, and it is unclear whether its members believe they have a
continuing role
the IMB has not been granted formal authority by the GoA to serve as a national mine
action authority

Thus, the need for mine action legislation remains, but it is unclear when this would get on the
legislative agenda.
Textbox 2 – Critical organs for national ownership
International experience suggests the following organs are required for a national mine action
programme:
o
o

National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) – an inter-ministerial committee to set policy &
oversee the Mine Action Centre
National Mine Action Centre (MAC) – to coordinate/regulate the implementation of the
policy*

In addition, members of the NMAA serve on a part-time basis, so secretariat functions (policy
analysis and administrative) must be provided, either by the MAC or by a distinct Secretariat
established for that purpose.
* The actual providers of the mine action services (demining; MRE; VA) are normally termed operators,
which could be independent (firms; NGOs), public service (civil defence; military; statutory body) or both.
See: IMAS 02.10, Guide for the Establishment of a National Mine Action Programme

OPERATORS
Demining
Afghan organisations have played central roles in demining since the start of mine action in the
country. The Afghan NGOs have very significant capacities for operations, but years of
paternalist ‘partnership’ by MACA has weakened their independence. The new MACA business
model (projectisation, competition) should help. With greater independence, these organisations
could also make significant contributions outside the mine action field (e.g. community and rural
development; vocational training; survey).
A more fundamental concern is that these organisations are not truly NGOs. In addition to their
extreme dependency on the UN for funding, they have very weak governance mechanisms (e.g.
there is no clear way of removing or replacing the founding directors). This might discourage
donors – or, in future, the GoA – from funding them directly in the absence of the UN-MACA.
The international demining NGOs (HALO Trust and DDG) are nationalised to a large degree. It
is possible their local managers could decide to establish local demining NGOs or firms once the
international NGO departs.
International firms now provide most of the demining support for large reconstruction projects.
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Local demining firms have been formed (some affiliated with the demining NGOs) and the better
managed and financed of these are likely to win contracts for demining support to smaller
reconstruction, development, and commercial projects.
The GoA has not given clear indications whether the army or police will have responsibilities for
humanitarian demining in the future.
MRE
The Afghan NGOs have been the principal providers of MRE since the start of mine action in
Afghanistan. However, the ‘traditional MRE’ they provide (e.g. direct delivery of MRE in
refugee transit points or to communities) is of limited benefit once conflict and population
movements have stopped, and is unsustainable as a standalone activity. MRE needs to be more
tightly targeted to at-risk groups and delivered through established institutions. Accordingly,
MACA has been working effectively with the Ministry of Education and the Afghan Red
Crescent Society to provide ‘residual’ MRE services.
Victim Assistance
Progress has also been made toward national responsibility for victim assistance, although this
has been, quite properly, incorporated into a broader effort to formulate a national action plan for
disability programmes. The Ministries of Public Health and Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and
Disabled have both established Disability Assistance Units with MACA assistance, and
commitment appears to be growing in both ministries. In addition, the Ministry of Education is
making some progress on inclusive education. In spite of its limited resources, Afghanistan is
generally recognised as one of the countries that has made the most progress on incorporating
landmine survivor assistance within a broader movement for enhanced disability programming
and the recognition of the rights of persons with disabilities.
DONOR COORDINATION
Coordination among agencies supporting mine action
Mine action suffers from more general weaknesses in aid coordination within Afghanistan. The
efforts of the World Bank and others to advance the aid effectiveness agenda do not appear to
have borne fruit as yet due to (i) the weak government and its inability to assume the driver’s
seat, (ii) the political and defence interests of key donors, (iii) lack of in-country donor capacity
(relatively small staffs due to insecurity, coupled with large, complex aid programmes).
In 2003-05 however, the Mine Action CG was quite effective due to the commitment of MFA
(principally, Dr. Reza in his role as Deputy Minister), CIDA, and the MACA. The reorganisation
of the aid coordination mechanism following the Afghan Compact, coupled with transfers of key
people, has weakened coordination for mine action, both among donors and (more importantly)
between government and the donors.
Donor agencies could capitalise on the presence of Dr. Reza to re-invigorate a government-donor
forum for coordination and, especially, policy dialogue. However, which donor is capable of and
committed to taking the lead?
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Coherence of CIDA’s proposed investment with other donor strategies
CIDA’s support for mine action is coherent42 with other donor strategies, but only in the
relatively weak sense that most mine action donors share a sense of assumptions, namely:
o
o
o
o
o

explosives contamination is a significant problem in Afghanistan
addressing explosives contamination can facilitate security, peace-building,
reconstruction and development
mine action delivers concrete benefits and the programme functions better than most
others in Afghanistan
transition to national ownership is called for by 2013, and
in the interim, progress toward eventual transition is ‘a good thing’

It is hard to go much further than that in the absence of a medium-term strategy (first, from
MACA; second, from the GoA).
Coherence vis-à-vis exit strategy and handover of responsibilities to the GoA
Canada’s announced support for mine action is not inconsistent with an eventual exit and transfer
to national responsibility. Again, however, the absence of medium-term strategies/plans from the
UN and the GoA makes it impossible to analyse this further.
MAINSTREAMING MINE ACTION
Mainstreaming of MRE and VA is well underway. In this section, therefore, we focus on
demining issues.
MACA support to the overall development and reconstruction process
The mine action sector has done good job in supporting reconstruction; initially via services
coordinated by MACA for the high-profile emergency reconstruction projects (major roads;
Kabul airport). Now however, the ‘core’ MAPA organisations (MACA & the demining NGOs)
have been supplanted, and most demining in support of reconstruction is done by international
firms engaged via standard project contracting mechanisms. (One problem is that these have
corporate links to private security firms, which could erode the ‘humanitarian space’ traditionally
accorded to demining NGOs in Afghanistan.)
More recently, there are some good initiatives to support development (e.g. the UNESCO and
Japanese cultural development projects in Bamyan), but links to key ministries – in particular, the
Ministry of Reconstruction and Rural Development (MRRD) – remain underdeveloped. Senior
MACA officials are aware of this shortcoming and, undoubtedly, plan to take action: it remains
to be seen whether they will be able to find the time to do so in a concerted fashion.
GoA political will and responsiveness to mainstream demining components
While recognising the danger of generalising about a government’s political will,43 particularly in
42
In the development cooperation field, coherence usually refers to the internal consistency of a donor
government’s policies vis-à-vis a country receiving assistance (particularly ‘3-D’ policies; diplomacy,
defence, development). The assessment team was not asked to examine or comments upon the consistency
of CIDA’s support to mine action with other Canadian government policies for Afghanistan.
43
Who is the ‘government’? In all governments there are many divergent opinions, most of which remain
unresolved (i.e. no clear Cabinet decision is taken).
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Afghanistan, the assessment team would summarise the prevailing view as:
o
o

mine action is a moderately high priority, but…
it’s not broken, so there’s no need to fix it.

Thus, the Government has never had to make a collective decision concerning mine action, and
its political will has not been tested.
Integrating mine action plans with national development goals
Clear targets for mine action are included in the Afghan Compact and ANDS. However, these are
‘high-level’ targets expressed as readily quantifiable indicators (numbers of impacted
communities; area suspected of contamination) that give very little sense of developmental
impact – indeed, there is always a danger that developmental benefits will be sacrificed for
efficiency in attaining quantitative performance targets. It would be more useful to set targets for
mine action – particularly demining – in terms of enabling development investments to proceed
in other sectors and at the community level. However, this is difficult to do unless the sectoral,
provincial, and community development plans (and planning processes) are well articulated,
which is not generally the case in Afghanistan.
Mine action also falls into the security sector, where the dominant perception is that security is a
pre-condition for development rather than something that should be integrated with development
(e.g. in planning, implementation, and evaluation processes). More generally, ANDS remains
quite compartmentalised, and the cross-sectoral links are not well elaborated.
MACA capacity to mainstream across development programs
Clearly, MACA and other MAPA organisations often make links with development plans and
initiatives at both community and district levels: the modest spatial scale makes potential linkages
easy to spot, and the decision-makers are close at hand. LIAT teams should further enhance this,
in part by spotting potential links earlier in the planning and tasking cycle (i.e. well before
specific task priorities are determined for demining).
Mainstreaming is far more difficult at the provincial44 and, especially, national levels as different
departments and agencies – often far removed from the ground – base decisions on different data
in pursuit of different performance targets that have not been determined in an integrated or
coordinated manner.45
Based on a very incomplete sample of ministry officials and on interviews with mine action
managers, the assessment team has the sense that awareness of the need to consider and, perhaps,
address explosives contamination is high among donor/international agencies, but low among
44

The ANDS states that “consultations included the formulation of around 18,500 village based
development plans, leading to 290 district development plans, which were finally consolidated into 34
Provincial Development Plans.” (ANDS Executive Summary, p. 3) We have not seen any of these district
or provincial development plans.
45
More generally, the IMF/World Bank Joint Staff Note on the ANDS stressed that “There are far too
many actions and projects throughout the ANDS document, which detracts from prioritization both across
and within sectors. Moreover, the ANDS generally does not clarify which projects/sectors will be pursued
at the expense of others, if necessary,” (Joint Staff Advisory Note on the Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper, 15 May 2008, p. 5) Basically, the authors of the Note believe the GoA has avoided tough choices by
forecasting more financing than is likely to materialise – a ‘soft budget constraint’.
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government planners and managers. Personnel in international agencies have inflated perceptions
of risks and ‘over-prescribe’ demining (perhaps for reasons of liability and insurance).
Conversely, government officials in Kabul and provincial capitals seem rarely to hear that
demining agencies have supported development projects and, perhaps, assume that explosives
contamination is not much of a problem.
If our perceptions are correct, MACA has done a good job in raising awareness within the
international community (perhaps even inflating the risks), but has not done systematic outreach
to government officials whose work programmes may be affected by explosives contamination.
MONITORING AND EVALUATION
Capacity for pre- and post-clearance assessment
The Afghan LIS collected a great deal of socio-economic data on thousands of communities,
providing a baseline for monitoring progress and assessing developmental achievements.46 It is
clear that MACA managers understand the potential value of the LIS as they have created LIAT
teams, giving MACA the capacity to update the LIS (pre-clearance survey) and to collect postclearance socio-economic data. MACA/MAPA has relatively good capacity in this regard. These
post-clearance assessments allow monitoring of outputs, ‘reach’ (i.e. has the land gone to the
intended beneficiaries?) and short-term outcomes (e.g. is the land being used as envisaged?).47
Capacity for M & E of progress toward development results
Unfortunately, MACA still lacks the capacity to analyse LIAT data to report meaningfully on the
development results accruing from mine action. As can be seen from the following summary
table, benefits from land cleared are presented in terms of annual gross income, with no
adjustment for the costs of inputs (labour, capital, seed, etc.).48 MACA personnel lack the tools to
analyse the streams of costs and benefits over time, and to discount these to present value terms.
Table 3 – Summary of LIAT findings for 2007
Region
South
West
North
N-E
East
S-E
Central
Total

Cleared MF/BF (m2)
1,386,850
6,145,962
3,063,297
714,054
5,563,962
5,438,806
2,860,010
25,172,940

Annual production ($)
$ 56,696
2,240,013
175,869
1,016,420
139,738
382,914
707,639
4,719,289

Beneficiaries
5,260
82,760
50,114
415,683
49,273
18,139
51,826
673,055

As well, these summary figures say nothing of the distribution of benefits – are benefits going to
the poorest households or (somewhat weaker) to deserving households? Is the cleared land owned
privately or by the state (for, e.g. schools, mosques, clinics), or is it common pool resources (e.g.
46
Like all such surveys, the primary purpose of the ALIS was to set priorities. For this, however, only a
small sub-set of data is used – principally that relating to recent victims.
47
For some time, various results-based management experts have advocated ‘reach’ as an intermediate
result between ‘output’ and ‘outcome’.
48
In Afghanistan, one must also be concerned about the misuse of cleared land – obviously, poppy
cultivation but also land theft.
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grazing land). To what degree do women benefit from clearance? The assessment team
understands that some data along these lines are collected, but not in a systematic fashion to
facilitate regular analysis and periodic reporting.
The experience of the 1997-99 Socio-economic impact study (SEIS) by MCPA and the Socioeconomic Impact of Mine Action in Afghanistan (SIMAA) study shows that the proper analysis
of socio-economic benefits is a difficult challenge. The analysis and presentation of LIAT
findings could and should be improved, but this still would provide little insight into the
distribution of benefits and, more fundamentally, the impact of demining on individuals,
households, and communities. Our collective ignorance on rural vulnerability and sustainable
livelihoods (the relationship between crops and grazing; different livelihoods for different social
groups; etc.) places a limit on what we can interpret from the type of data collected by LIAT
teams. A number of groups within Afghanistan are working on such issues,49 but there has been
no interchange between them and MACA/MAPA.
Monitoring and evaluation of gender results
As is well known, gender roles in Afghanistan are sharply divided and unequal, with women in a
subordinate position. These relations are the result of long-term cultural and historical processes
that mine action (along with other internationally-supported programmes) can only influence on
the margin. Mine action services could and should be delivered to women as well as men, and
MAPA organisations have endeavoured to do so when the opportunity has presented itself
(women MRE instructors; MRE and disability rights messages in schools; etc.). As well, more
opportunities for employment within mine action should be available to women – MACA itself
has a number of women on staff (including the Deputy Programme Director), but still the vast
majority of people working in the sector are men.
More fundamentally, MAPA organisations still have little opportunity (i) to ensure that women as
well as men are actively engaged at the community level in determining priorities for clearance
and other mine action services, or (ii) to determine the degree to which women benefit equally
from these services. One of the MAPA organisations (DDG) is planning a project to assess
women’s perceptions on explosives contamination and mine action, which will provide a startingpoint.
Monitoring and evaluation of the new ‘business model’
It is clear the new business model poses some more sophisticated quality management
challenges. The introduction of competition invariably strengthens incentives for performance,
and it is critical that a broader range of indicators is used to ensure incentives are aligned with
desired performance, rather than what can be readily measured.
UNOPS and UNMAS now have a good deal of experience in contracting for mine action
services. In many cases, and particularly where contract monitoring is complicated by
inaccessibility and insecurity (e.g. South Sudan), UNOPS uses a combination of cost-plus
contracts (which lessen the incentives to cut corners) plus QA on both processes (e.g. prior
approval of clearance plans for assigned tasks) and the demining itself.
49

These include the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU – an independent research
organisation based in Kabul), the National Surveillance System–Vulnerability Assessment Unit (NSS–
VAU) based at the Ministry of Reconstruction and Rural Development, MRRU, but perhaps moving to the
Central Statistic Office, and the Afghan Institute for Rural Development (AIRD); also part of MRRD
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We understand the initial contracts awarded for Afghanistan in 2008 are for a fixed-price. Thus, a
more stringent monitoring regime is required to ensure contractors do not reduce quality and
safety standards to increase profits. Both contracts were awarded to well-established demining
firms that would take pains to protect their reputations, particularly in dealings with UNOPS and
UNMAS, which represent a major portion of the market for commercial demining services. Still,
MACA will need to make a special effort to provide adequate external QA on these contracts.
In the current Afghan context, it cannot be assumed that the delivery of demining outputs (i.e.
cleared land) will lead to sound development outcomes. The assessment team is unaware of any
efforts by UNOPS or UNMAS to incorporate development outcomes into their demining
contracts or to evaluate the development effectiveness of their programmes (e.g. Sudan, South
Lebanon, Eritrea, Kosovo).50 As well, the recent evaluation commissioned by UNMAS of its
Sudan programme was ‘tightly scripted’51 and the report has not been placed in the public
domain. This approach probably would be inadequate to provide a broad assessment of the merits
of the new business model relative to other possible approaches (e.g. sole sourced contracts to
NGOs; cost-plus contracts; etc.). At the very least, UNMAS should:
•
•
•
•

advise donors well in advance of any evaluation;
circulate the draft ToRs to key stakeholders (donors; GoA) for comment before these are
finalised;
give significant freedom to the evaluation team to develop its own methodology and
work plan for achieving the evaluation objectives; and
share the evaluation report with key stakeholders and, ideally, put it in the public domain.

Regardless, it will always be difficult to obtain a broad and balanced assessment of the
development outcomes stemming from demining in insecure environments. Again, this points to
the need for innovative approaches to complement traditional methods of quality management
(QA and M&E). The vulnerability or sustainable livelihoods research effort discussed earlier
would help in this regard. As well, MACA might contract the evaluation unit of MRRD or a
community development NGO already working in a region to do independent assessments of (i)
inclusive participation in setting priorities, (ii) community satisfaction with demining activities,
and (iii) development outcomes.

50

In most programmes led by UNMAS, its first priority is to a UN peacekeeping mission, and the bulk of
its funding is provided for this explicit purpose via the UN assessed budget for peacekeeping operations.
51
We understand that the draft ToRs were not shared with all key stakeholders prior to being finalised. The
ToRs suggest that UNMAS engaged three separate evaluators and formed them into a team that followed
an evaluation plan established by UNMAS and its Programme Director in Sudan. We would characterise
the exercise as more of a performance audit to inform UNMAS management than an independent
evaluation to account to donors, the host government, etc.
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4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS
MACA and the MAPA organisations have, collectively, great capacity to address contamination
problems but also to make more substantial contributions to peace-building, reconstruction and
poverty reduction.
MACA now has a strong management team in place, which has initiated some excellent reforms.
Its managers are thinking strategically, but it still have not written-up a formal strategy and
medium-term plan to ensure: (i) the GoA and donors understand and endorse the objectives and
direction of the programme, and (ii) the reforms and strategic direction are locked-in when
management team members depart.
Some progress has been made in (i) bringing Afghan nationals into decision-making positions
within MACA and (ii) promoting national ownership (particularly for MRE and VA). Recently
the inter-ministerial body has provided some clarification concerning the agency to serve as the
government focal point for mine action – the Department for Mine Clearance (DMC), which then
collocated with MACA. However:
o
o
o

the DMC presently has little capability and unknown commitment
the endorsement of the DMC as the focal point stemmed from an ad hoc process, which
may not represent the final position of the GoA
the broader institutional framework (laws; national organs) has not been agreed.

The UN has a responsibility to transition and exit (currently envisaged for 2013). However, a
successful transition requires the existence of a capable and committed organisation to assume
responsibility for the residual contamination problem. The UN can support capacity development
of the DMC if that department has some basic management and technical capacity to build upon,
plus the leadership to implement change and performance improvements.
Conversely, the GoA has the responsibility to develop the capacity of its national mine action
organs (DMC, but also a national authority). The UN can only successfully support capacity
development if the GoA is committed both to (i) assume national ownership and (ii) actually
deliver the required mine action services to its people.
THE WAY FORWARD
What is needed at this juncture is clear: first, a strategy from MACA that would clarify its vision
for the future and provide the basis for policy dialogue with both the Government and the
supporting donors. The intended outcome of the MACA strategy and the policy dialogue would
be a well conceived Government strategy for the national mine action programme. CIDA could
play an important role in this process. Specific recommendations are:
1.

MACA should assess whether DMC personnel have the basic skills and commitment for a
successful capacity development process. At minimum, these pre-conditions for success are
(i) adequately educated and experienced personnel and (ii) a champion for change in the
senior management ranks of DMC. If these pre-conditions are not in place, the UN should
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not waste time and money on capacity development support until changes are agreed.
2.

MACA should formulate a strategy and multi-year plan for itself and the MAPA, covering:
o what it will do (e.g. continue operations reforms to achieve clearance targets)
o how it will:
• support the GoA in formulating a government strategy for assuming national
ownership of the mine action programme
• support the GoA to implement its strategy once it is in place
• assess progress towards its goals and objectives (i.e. a monitoring and evaluation
framework, plus a tentative schedule for evaluations)
o the pre-conditions required of ANDMA and, more generally, the GoA before launching a
concerted programme of support to the capacity development efforts of DMC and a
future national mine action authority

3.

Accordingly, the GoA should formulate its strategy for mine action and the assumption of
national ownership. This should be based on:
o a forecast of the likely residual problem in 2013 (i.e. a needs analysis)
o decisions concerning the capacities (policy; regulation/coordination; operations/service
delivery) required to address this residual problem
o plans for key national organs (national authority; MAC)

4.

Donors should encourage the MACA and the GoA to join in a forum for:
o policy dialogue, to:
o encourage and support the GoA to formulate its national strategy for mine action
o encourage MACA to formulate ‘whole of government’ policies regarding
explosives contamination
o joint monitoring of progress on both the MACA strategy and, eventually, the GoA
national mine action strategy
o commissioning periodic joint evaluations of MACA, MAPA, and GoA progress in
developing its capacity and commitment for assuming ownership of the national mine
action programme.
This forum should normally meet every six months, although more frequent meetings should
take place until the GoA formulates its national mine action strategy and following any joint
evaluations. MACA should provide the secretariat services, and the presence of
representatives from UNMAS and, perhaps, UNOPS would be expected.

5.

CIDA should consider bolstering its own capacity to resume its role as the donor focal point
for mine action within the CG mechanism.

6.

MACA should consider strengthening its capacities for monitoring and evaluation of
demining by introducing a sustainable livelihoods approach in conjunction with, initially,
MCPA and in partnership with the Afghan Institute for Rural Development (AIRD – part of
MRRD). Secondary objectives of this effort would be capacity development for LIAT teams
plus the introduction of Afghan sustainable livelihoods and rural development specialists to
the field of mine action.

7.

CIDA and other donors should consider a separate project to strengthen the Afghan demining
NGOs, which have great capacity to contribute in other sectors (community development;
rural development; vocational training), subject to the following:
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o
o

one or more of the Afghan NGOs need to request such assistance
the project should not be implemented by MACA or the UN
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APPENDIX I – TERMS OF REFERENCE
BACKGROUND
After more than two decades of conflict, Afghanistan is one of the most heavily mine
contaminated countries in the world, posing a formidable challenge to social and
economic reconstruction of the country. Landmines affect more than 4 million people,
living in 2,368 communities. In 2007, an estimated 756 square kilometers are considered
contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), concentrated in 12 of
Afghanistan's 34 provinces. Canada has played a leadership role in addressing the
global landmine crisis and championing the goals of the Mine Ban Treaty. In
Afghanistan, Canada has funded mine action initiatives since 1990.
In developing Canada's action plan to respond to the Ottawa Convention, CIDA was
specifically mandated to provide funding in the areas of victim assistance (VA), mines
risk education (MRE) and humanitarian demining, while DFAIT took leadership in policy
dialogue and non-humanitarian demining, and DND was tasked with demining
technology research."
The international community and the Government approved the Afghanistan Compact
and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy in February 2006. These
documents provide a framework for institution building and reconstruction, establishing
benchmarks for various sectors. Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Afghanistan
must destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as
soon as possible, but no later than 1 March 2013, with an interim target of reducing the
area contaminated by mines and UXO by 70 per cent by 2010, in accordance with the
Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy.
1.

Support to UNMACA and Mine Action in Afghanistan via UNMAS:

The Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (MACA) is a project of the United Nations Mine
Action Service (UNMAS), which serves as the UN focal point for mine action globally,
and is executed by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), which
provides contracting, procurement, financial management, and technical and legal
assistance. As of May 2007 UNMACA had 22 international staff, all based in Kabul.
MACA coordinates the activities of the Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA), an
association of more than twenty accredited NGOs and commercial contractors involved
in one or more mine action components including clearance, mine risk education (MRE)
and victim assistance (VA).
The Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the MACA coordinate activities under the
direction of the Mine Action Consultative Working Group, a mechanism created to
respond to the requirements of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. The
group provides strategic guidance to the MACA, develops policies and legislative
frameworks, and monitors MAPA activities and targets. In addition, it is working towards
a transfer of responsibility for mine action activities from the UN to national authorities.
Each year, UN entities, nongovernmental organizations, national and local authorities
and donors collaborate to assemble a national portfolio of mine action project proposals
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that together reflect the strategic response developed in the field to all aspects of the
problem of landmines and explosive remnants of war. A Country Portfolio Coordinator,
usually a representative of a UN agency or a national authority, coordinates meetings
where all mine action actors agree on a set of projects and priorities and determine
funding needs. The proposals in each country's portfolio are assembled with those of
other participating countries and published jointly by the UN Mine Action Service, the UN
Development Programme and UNICEF in an annual "Portfolio of Mine Action Projects."
This publication serves as a tool for collaborative resource mobilization, coordination
and planning of mine action activities. The Afghanistan (Islamic Republic of) Country
Portfolio Team's funding appeal for mine action projects in 2007 totalled US
$77,755,277.
As part of this project, UNMACA proposes to undertake components that include, but
are not limited to the following:
• To plan, coordinate, support and shape mine action in Afghanistan in line with
strategic and operational plans and frameworks to achieve yearly targets;
• To ensure quality of mine action activities; and,
• To develop capacities within relevant parts of the Government of Afghanistan and
related bodies to provide national authorities with the tools and expertise to assume
responsibilities for long-term coordination and policy-making roles for mine action.
UNMACA has an internal three-year plan for 2007-2009 that is updated annually based
on progress made in the previous year. The MAPA adopted a 10-year strategic plan in
2003, which was revised in 2005 to take account of land impact suvey findings, the
expectation that UNMACA would transition to a national program, and the requirement
for mine clearance to support rehabilitation of national infrastructure as well as
humanitarian needs. In the transition to national ownership, an Inter-Ministerial Board for
Mine Action was established under the Department for Mine Clearance, which is part of
the Agency for Disaster Preparedness.
The MAPA also has a nationwide strategy to involve women in mine action efforts
despite difficulties caused by cultural concerns within Afghan society, which has resulted
in advocacy activities that have included both genders. Although women constitute a
minority casualty group (less than five percent in 2006), they play a key role in educating
their children in risk-avoidance. A Gender Equality in Mine Action Programmes learning
symposium was held in Dubai in early September 2006.
Challenges
Some of the challenges reported in the 2007 Landmine Monitor report on demining in
Afghanistan and known to ATF are as follows:
a) The transition to full national ownership of the program formally started in June 2005,
and was expected to take two years. After progress in 2005-2006, the transition process
stalled; the government expressed no view on how it wanted to proceed and no
transition timetable was agreed by the government and the UN for most of 2007.
b) Afghanistan’s ability to complete clearance obligations before the Treaty-bound
deadline is unclear based on the progress made so far..
c) The collection of comprehensive mine/ERW casualty data in Afghanistan remains
problematic, due in part to communication constraints and the time needed to centralize
information.
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2.

Rationale

Since 1989, Canada has provided $84.3 million for demining, the vast majority of this
through UNMACA. CIDA recently announced a 48-month project with UNMACA of a
total value of CAD$80,000,000 to be dispersed in annual contributions of
CAD$20,000,000.
Given the significant investment in demining, as well as the intended outcomes of this
program – CIDA would like to optimize the opportunity afforded by the EC Evaluation
and consult GICHD’s expertise in this sector to write a report. The resulting report will
inform CIDA/ATF what constitutes reasonable expectations for UNMACA/UNMAS
reporting on development results and to assess the feasible timelines and approaches
for UNMACA’s proposed nationalization plan.
3.

Specific Objectives:

The consultant is asked to pursue the following research questions in the course of his
visit to the field:
Donor coordination
− To assess whether CIDA’s proposed investment is coherent with other donor
strategies for mine action in Afghanistan, particularly as it pertains to an exit strategy
for UNMAS/UNMACA and handover of responsibilities in the mine action sector to
the GoATo assess the coordination among other agencies supporting mine action in
Afghanistan
Nationalization
− To provide a preliminary assessment of progress in the transition to full national
ownership of the program, which should include consideration of the following: the
capacity of relevant ministries; sustainability of funding; drafting and enforcement of
mine action legislation; and, clarification of responsibilities between different GoA
ministries.
− To assess the Mine Action Consultative Working Group, and the Inter-ministerial
Board for Mine Action
− To provide a preliminary assessment the GoA Ministries identified for handover of all
components of mine action
Mainstreaming of components of mine action
- To provide a preliminary assessment of UNMACA’s support to the overall
development and reconstruction process
- To provide a preliminary assessment of UNMACA support to integrate mine action
plans with national development goals and the GoA’s political will and responsiveness to
mainstream demining components
- To assess the capacity of MACA to mainstream components of mine action across
development programs, particularly within UN agencies.
Monitoring and Evaluation
To assess the capacity within MACA in Afghanistan to undertake the following:
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o
o
o
4.

Socio-economic assessments (i.e. Pre- and post-clearance
assessments);
Monitoring and evaluation of progress toward development results; and,
Monitoring and evaluation of gender results.

Services Required:

Professional services are required as per background information above as well as their
subject matter expertise and familiarity with the country and its political context.
In consultation with the responsible officers for the CIDA program, the consultant will:
a) Review background documents:
(i) review project files and briefing notes;
(ii) Coordinate with the organizations;
(iii) meet with officers at the Development Aid Section in Kabul.
b) Draft a work plan to include dates of scheduled visits; list of key contacts and
persons to be interviewed.
c) Draft a report that addresses the research questions outlined above.
5.

Duration of the consultancy:

Preparations, field visits, interviews, report writing and debriefings should be completed
before the end of June 2008.
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APPENDIX 2 – ITINERARY & MEETINGS
16-17 May 2008 – T. Paterson & W. Fryer Geneva  Kabul
T. Paterson & W. Fryer – Kabul (18-25 May)
18 May
MACA
Dr. Haider Reiza
Programme Director
Susan Helseth
Deputy Programme Director
Alan Macdonald
Chief of Staff
19 May
MACA
Mohammad Sidiq
Chief of Operations
Mohammad Wakil
Plans Officer
Abdul Qader Kakar
EOD Associate
Aimal
Chief, QM
Mo Shafiq Yosufi
Sr Ops Manager
Idress Nabiyar
Operations Assistant
Samin Hashimi
MRE Programme Coordinator
MACA
Susan Helseth
Deputy Programme Director
MACA
Alan Macdonald
Chief of Staff
Counsellor Development
Canadian Embassy Georgina Wigley
Karolina Guay
20 May
EC Delegation
Clement Bourse
Programme manager
21 May
German Embassy
Erich Schmidt
Second Secretary
MACA
Susan Helseth
Deputy Programme Director
22 May
ATC, OMAR,
Directors Mine Action
MCPA, DAFA,
NGOs
MDC, DDG, HALO
ArmorGroup
Rob Halam
Country Manager Mine Action
Mir Mo Shaker
Operation Officer
25 May
MDC
Mo. Shohab Hakimi
Director
OMAR
Fazel Karim Fazel
Director
DDG
Clinton Smith
Country Programme Manager
MACA
Mohammad Wakil
Plans Officer
Mashooq Karim
Sr Plans Associate
F. Paktian & W. Fryer – Bamyan (26-29 May)
26 May
AMAC-Bayan
Abdul Quader Qayomi
Operations Officer
UNAMA
Heran Song
Head of Office Bamiyan
NZ-PRT
Lt Col Richard Tracy
Contingent Commander
ATC-Bamyan
Achmed Zafer Mujaddi
Senior Operations Manager
Bamiyan Field Office
27 May
ATC-Team 39
Zahidullah
Team Leader
Sayed Burhan
Section Leader
Bamyan Provincial
Habibi Sarabi
Governor
Government
Directorship of
Najebullah Ahran
Director
Information and
Culture Bamyan
Afghanistan
Sayed Mohammad Tahir
Director
National Security
Wasiq
Bamyan Office
29 May
Afghanistan
Lt Col Qudsi
Chief of Security National
National Police
Police
Agha Khan
Sanjef Gupta
Programme Manager
Foundation
Provincial Council
Jawad Zuhak
Secretary / Deputy of Shura
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T. Paterson – Kabul (26-29 May)
26 May
DAFA
Eng Sattar
Director
ATC
Kefayatullah Eblagh
Director
HALO Trust
Dr. Farid Homayoun
Country Director
Tom Dibb
Sr Operations Officer
27 May
AMAC-Kabul
Akbar Oriakbil
AMAC Manager
Shafiquallah Seddiqi
AMAC Deputy Manager
28 May
MACA
UNMAS/UNOPS debriefing to operators on recent RFPs
29 May
MCPA
Haji Attiquallah
Director
T. Paterson, F. Paktian, W. Fryer – Kabul (30 May – 6 June)
30 May
MineTech
Max Dyck
Business Development
International
Manager
UNOPS
Paul Hyslop
Manager, Mine Action Unit
1 June
DMC
Abdul Haq Rahim (&
Director
others)
DynCorp
George Zacaczewsky
Program Manager
Skip Hartberger
Task Order Project Manager
Michael McDonnell
Senior Technical Advisor
UNMAS
Cris Stephen
Programme Officer
2 June
MACA
Amir Omeragic
Senior Programme Officer
Japanese Embassy Kenji Inoue
Second Secretary Economic
Cooperation Section
Kavil A Mohan
Chief of Staff
UNDP
Besmillah Ekhlas
Programme Officer
Fakhruddin Azizi
Head of UNIDO Operations
Dr Basir Ahmad Sarwari
Assistant Country Director
3 June
Min. of Education
Ariana
Advisor to the Minister
Mutahar Shah Akhgar
Mine Action Advisor
MACA
Steve Williams
Technical Advisor
Canadian Embassy Debriefing by GICHD to CIDA, EC, MACA
4 June
Ministry of Public
Dr Armahdzai
Acting Director, Primary Health
Health (MoPH)
Care
Mohammad Ghami Amin
Disability Dept Advisor
Dr Wasiq
PHC Advisor
Dr Azeem Jaevid
PHC Advisor (HIV M&E)
MoPH
Dr Pashtoonyar
Advisor to the Minister
Ministry of Labour,
Wasil Noor Momard
Deputy Minister
Social Affairs,
Said Ahmad Zia Bina
Disability Support Unit
Martyrs & Disabled
Coordinator/Advisor
5 June
JCMB Secretariat
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1 July 2008 – Telephone interview with Hubert Gielissen, former UNDP Capacity Development
Advisor.
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APPENDIX 3 – ENHANCED SURVEY PROCESS
Figure 14 – Traditional survey & clearance process
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Figure 15 – Enhanced survey & clearance process (current)
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Figure 16 – Enhanced survey & clearance process (planned)
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